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Saint-Je Derrida 
Laurent Milesi 
Question: * What animal would you be if you could be an 
animal?' 
Answer: 'You already are an animal'. 1 
In the interview with Derek Attridge on 'This Strange Institution 
Called Literature' Derrida muses over the narcissistic' moment of his 
adolescent desire to write and seek a place from which the history of 
the frontier between philosophy and literature could be thought anew. 
Autobiography is suggested as the 'least adequate' term for the attempt 
to remember this obscure yet compulsive desire or 'dream of keeping 
a trace of all the voices which were traversing me - or were almost 
doing so, 'the unique event whose trace one would like to keep alive', 
and his ongoing obsession 'to save in uninterrupted inscription, in the 
form of a memory, what happens - or fails to happen, Confessing 
to a penchant for a certain practice of fiction, 'the intrusion of an 
effective simulacrum or of disorder into philosophical writing' (rather 
than reading novels or the telling and invention of stories), Derrida 
then points out that this 'irrepressible need [ . . . ] would refuse to show 
itself so long as it has not cleared a space or organized a dwelling-place 
suited to the animal which is still curled up in its hole half asleep.' 2 
It is such a configuration of the trace, simulation and autobiography 
that I would like to investigate and extend in relation to the 
Derridean reproblematization of the animal. Rather than conjuring 
up the procession of those real or Active beasts that have transited 
through Derrida's texts - a textual bestiary or 'zoo-auto-bio-biblio­
graphy' he himself briefly sketched in L'Animalque done je suis* - our 
argument will follow in the footsteps or tracks of the 'animality or 
even calculated betise of Derridean writing, 4 its mimicking or singerie 
of the sacralization of the subject who autobiographically signs 
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T (or saint-je), its impersonations as i f as opposed to as such', like 
an actor or artefactor, from the quasi-inaugural conception of the trace 
and operation of differance as a distant anticipation of Derridas more 
recent systematic rethinking of the animal, through a collection of 
some of his animal-like signatures, to the impact such a philosophical 
repositioning has on the conception of mimesis, reflection and being 
within deconstruction as a critique of onto(theo)logical specularity. 
1. 'je le suis a la trace^ 
It is worth retracing our steps momentarily to recall that the Derridean 
understanding of writing has always been linked, from its inception, 
to that of the effacement of an animal trace, within a critique of 
the neutralization or forgetting by anthropologocentrism of the zoic 
origin of the logos — man being classically defined as an animal 
endowed with speech/language (zoon logon ekhon).6 As L'Animal que 
done je suissummarizes, '[l]a marque, le gramme, la trace, la difference, 
concernent differentiellement tous les vivants, tous les rapports du 
vivant au non-vivant' {Animal, p. 144). Thus , even before the explicit 
interweavings of trace, trace'and tracement, across 'graphics' and tracks, 
in 'Differance' and more generally the complexification of the border 
between animality and humanity in Margins of Philosophy, 'Linguistics 
and Grammatology had stated that the trace, 'arche-phenomenon 
of "memory", [ . . , ] must be thought before the opposition of [ . . . ] 
animality and humanity', soon after expressing an affinity with 
Levinas's (but also Nietzsche's, Freud's and Heidegger's) conception 
of the trace in his critique of ontology as 'relationship to the illeity 
as to the alterity of a past that never was and can never be lived 
in the originary or modified form of presence'. 7 Taken as the mark 
of differance as tempor(al)ization, the Derridean trace is by structural 
necessity constituted by erasure, or, as Gasche neatly summarizes: 
for Derrida, the word designates something of which the 
metaphysical concepts of trace and presence are the erasure. 
From Derrida's analysis of Heidegger's concept of die friihe 
Spur, it follows that trace is the necessarily metaphysical 
concept that names an originary tracing and effacement, of 
which the traditional conceptual dyad of trace and presence 
within the metaphysical text is the trace of effacement[. . . ] . 8 
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Reinscribing or re-marking the metaphysical concept, the Derridean 
'trace' (arche-trace) is always already the trace of a trace 9 as it is affected 
by a structure of doubling and deferral, and its originary effacement will 
be repeated in the iterative drama of hierarchized differences according 
to a structure of delay or Naehtraglichkeit™ that makes it akin to the 
Freudian-Lacanian trauma as the repetition of what never was. T h e 
tropic turn within the structure of (effacement or erasure) of the trace 
is to be understood as the disappearance of the origin which did 
not even disappear {Of Grammatology, p. 61) , and in 'This Strange 
Institution Called Literature' Derrida will later remember this originary 
nonpresence both in his description of the history of literature as 'the 
history of a ruin, the narrative of a memory which produces the event 
to be told and which will never have been present' and of his desire 
to write 'so as to put into play or to keep the singularity of the date 
(what does not return, what is not repeated, promised experience of 
memory as promise, experience of ruin or ashes)' (Aets of Literature, 
p. 42) . According to this 'grammatologic', which is also an 'archeo-logy' 
covering its own tracks, the animal as living being whose primordiality 
has been forgotten (compare with what 'primate' etymologically means 
and denotes), deprived of the voice valorized over writing by classical 
philosophy {OfGrammatology, p. 196), may be aligned with the arche-
trace or archi-eeriture as primarily 'zoographical', as in the following 
reversal of Plato's and Rousseau's distrust of writing as the painting 
{zoographid) of life (zoe) or of the animal or living being (zoon): 
Writing is like painting, like the zoographemey which is 
itself determined [. . . ] within a problematic of mimesis 
[. . . ] Here painting - zoography - betrays being and 
speech, words and things themselves because it freezes 
them. Its offshoots seem to be living things but when 
one questions them, they no longer respond [cf. LAnimal 
que done je suis, especially the third section entitled 'Et si 
l'animal repondait?', and infd\. Zoography has brought 
death. T h e same goes for writing. [ . . . ] . Writing carries 
death. One could play on this: writing as zoography as 
that painting of the living which stabilizes animality, is, 
according to Rousseau, the writing of savages. Who are also, 
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as we know, only hunters: men of the zoogreia, of the 
capture of the living. Writing would indeed be the pictorial 
representation of the hunted beast: magical capture and 
murder. {OfGrammatology, p. 292) 
Changing t(r)ack: in LAnimal que done je suis Derrida defines 
animality, the life of the living, as 'spontaneite [ . . . ] a se marquer elle-
meme, a se tracer et a s'affecter de traces de soi' (p. 75) , and though 
traditional thinking never denied the animal the power to trace or 
retrace its steps, the irreducible difference between the animal and man 
for metaphysics up to and including Lacan would remain the latter s 
ability to master his/her trace, not only the possibility of converting it 
into verbal language, for instance in a discursive structure of call and 
response or the autobiographical auto-affection of who says and writes 
'I (am)', but also of effacing it or protecting it from self-effacement 
{Animal, especially pp. 5 5 - 5 6 , 76) . If autobiography is l a trace du 
vivant pour soi' (p. 72) , and is therefore 'zootobiographicaT through 
and through (p. 59), opening it to the traces of the wholly other {tout 
autre) undifferentiatedly named by man the animal' and to whom man 
gave its names in Genesis (pp. 8 2 - 9 3 : 'inscrire en lui la trace de l'autre 
comme animal'), to what The Post Card had already called an auto-bio-
thanato-hetero-graphy which spectrally haunts all writing, 1 1 is therefore 
tantamount to questioning its onto (theo) logical and anthropocentric 
foundations and retracing it to an anterior, (self-) effaced origin. In the 
following excerpt the deconstructive syntax 'translates' the synthetic 
reduction and subjugation afforded by Hegelian Aufhebung {releve), 
to which the animal has been subjected throughout the history of 
metaphysics {relever de, to depend on, to come under the jurisdiction 
of) , into the possibility of the animal's self-conscious interaction with 
its own traces (e.g. relever des empreintes-. to take finger- or footprints): 
capio ergo sum.12 
L'animal que done je suis, a la trace, et qui releve des traces, 
qui est-ce? [ . . . ] Supposez-le signant une declaration, trace 
parmi d'autres, a la premiere personne, 'je', 'je suis'. Cette 
trace serait deja le gage ou l'engagement, la promesse d'un 
discours de la methode autobiographique. {Animal, p. 83; 
emphasis mine) 
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This autobiographical subject of LAnimal que done je suis who says 'I 
am (following)' {je suis) to the trace i^je suis a la trace), as one says 'to 
the letter', redeploys the logic of obsequence first seen in Glasy written 
in the wake of Derrida's dead father, then in the lecture on Nietzsche's 
'Otobiographies', or what happens when one says je suis (le mortj. 
I am (following) a dead parent, for instance during the procession 
at a funeral or obsequy, in their footsteps, also by inheritance, as it 
pertains to an 'elementary kinship structure'. 1 3 T h e development in 
'Otobiographies' follows from a passage about the origin of the subject's 
life in between 'life death' {la vie la mori) and identity, and introduces 
a famous quotation from 'Why I A m So Wise' at the beginning of Ecce 
Homa. 'I am [. . . ] already dead as my father [ . . . ] , while as my mother, 
I am still living and becoming old', glossed as follows: 
Inasmuch as 1am andfollow after [je suis] my father, I am 
\jesuis] the dead man and I am death. Inasmuch as Lam and 
follow after my mother, I am life that perseveres, I am the 
living and the living feminine. I am my father, my mother, 
and me, and me who is my father my mother and me, my 
son and me, death and life, the dead man and the living 
feminine, and so on . 1 4 
Widening the gyres of human kinship (generations and genders) from 
the elementary to the utmost generalizable proximity in being and 
living with (Heidegger's Mitsein and Mitleben), LAnimal que done je 
suis shifts the focus of the questioning from the perseverence to the 
persecution of life, from je suis — man inheriting from coming after 
somebody - to je poursuis (pp. 17, 82, 112) - the animal being 
disinherited of something, even sacrificed (especially p. 127); from je 
suis apres to jesuisaupres{p. 27) , from the earlier Nietzschean trace and 
incipit of Eece Homo to EcceAnimot. 
Ecce animot, voila l'annonce dont je suis comme la trace, 
au titre de l'animal autobiographique, en reponse aventuree, 
fabuleuse ou chimerique a la question 'Mais moi, qui suis-
je?' {Animal p. 74; emphasis mine) 1 5 
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I am (after) the trace of the animal, the trace of the trace as 
originary effacement 1 6 and erased by metaphysics, in response to the 
ontological question, just as a signature inaugurates a call to which 
a countersignature of (oneself as) the other must respond. It is not 
surprising therefore that Derrida should confess that 'it is impossible to 
follow my trace', 1 7 which Cixous's Portrait of Jacques Derrida as a Young 
fewish Saint will gloss as follows: 'lui-meme ne se suit pas, il perd sa 
trace, sa trace ne le suit pas' . 1 8 We shall now gather samples of Derridas 
(counter)signatures or textual responses, and decipher the 'animality' 
of these traces as an attempt to (pretend to) reinscribe and recover a 
(self-) effaced, radically altered other trace. 
2. Signs-J: signature scenes 
la confusion des signatures n'ayant de prix q u a faire venir 
[ . . . ] le tout autre 1 9 . 
T h e seminal essay 'Signature Event Context' famously ends with 
Derrida drawing the reader's attention in writing to his citational 
counterfeiting of the signature which was inscribed on the missive of 
his oral communication, addressed to the Association des societes de 
philosophic de langue fran9aise, thus proving by one last twist the 
iterability and reproducibility of the trace in absentia as the trace of 
a trace, countersigning it away as the last written mark of the essay 
(Margins, p. 330) . In SigneftongeDerridz will distinguish between three 
modalities of the signature, the last of which, general signature or 'the 
signature of the signature', resembles the dramatized replication of the 
act of signing in writing at the end of 'Signature Event Context' as it is 
le pli de la mise en abyme quand, a l'instar de la signature au 
sens courant, l'ecriture se designe, decrit et inscrit elle-meme 
comme acte [ . . . ] , se signe avant la fin en donnant a lire: je 
me ref ere a moi-meme, ceci est de l'ecriture, je suis ecriture, 
ceci est de Xecriture [... ] (Signeponge, p. 48) 
Such an acknowledgement of counterfeiting in the act of 
countersigning, the contraband of the signature already developed in 
Glasand recalled in Signeponge(p. 54; p. 103: 'la signature d'elle-meme 
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en contrebande'), ends up uncannily resembling a counterbluff or 
feinte de feinte, of the kind that Lacan denies the animal 'in general 
{Animal, p. 111 and p. I65ff.) and Derrida claims it is capable of, while 
wishing to dispute the possibility of establishing a clear demarcation 
between feigning and feigning to feign, just as the inscription and the 
effacement of a trace cannot be separated by an indivisible line {Animal, 
p. 185). In the meantime Derrida s texts had explored what turns the 
proper name of a signature into a thing or a rebus, for example Genet 
into a flower (broom) or a Spanish horse (jennet) in Glas, and Ponge 
into a zoophyte (sponge) in Signeponge (cf. also the swallow s and wasp's 
signatures, pp. 106, 108). 
At the end of the seventh and last missile/missive o f ' N o Apocalypse, 
Not Now', a commissioned essay addressing the aporetic issue of a 
nuclear criticism' which could testify to and after a 'remainderless 
cataclysm', Derrida takes on a more Biblical note and signs the essay 
away on the mention of John of Patmos, the disputed author of the 
Apocalypse to be sent (Greek apostellein, hence apostolos: messenger, 
envoy) to the seven churches, possibly identical to John the apostle, and 
brother to James, i. e. Jacques in French. 2 0 In the scene of 'revelation', 
of being naked in front of the animal's gaze - what binds the apo­
calypse to truth as aletheia, or un-veiling - Derrida will more explicitly 
write: j'esuis lapoclaypse mime {Animal, p. 30) . Some four years before 
the nuclear essay, the iterations of jaccepte in the 'Envois' section of 
The Post Cardhzd already allusively displayed this mock signature of a 
Jacques sept,21 'parodying God , with a whole theory of I ams' , 2 2 whose 
first and family names are both made up of seven letters (rather than 
missives), sent in apostolic succession to recipients unknown ('all of 
you') on multiple postcards, and now mock-countersigning the Book 
of Revelation 'in the name o f . . . ' 
The one who feigns, mimes and counterfeits signatures 'at the end' 
and evokes God's essence as the first and the last ('No Apocalypse, Not 
Now', 31) also calls himself le dernier desJuifi, i.e. the last and the least 
of the Jews. 'Officially launched in a text miming autobiographical 
confession while beating about {circum) the bush of circumcision 
('Circumfession, 36) , though originally from a 1976 notebook ('The 
Book of Elijah') in which Derrida wrote 'je joue sans jouer', this mock-
serious, double-ended formula can be read as a belated unpacking of 
'more and less Jewish than the Jew' in the essay on E d m o n d Jabes in 
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Writing and Difference, in a context developing the Jew's split identity 
and 'essential' noncoincidence with himself. 2 3 T h e more he dissimulates 
or feigns not to be what he is (the less he appears to be), the more he 
is: 'feintvrai marrane' . 2 4 Blurring his signatory traces across texts, the 
saint fuif usuriously and usurpingly converts into an animal feint fuif 
(feigned, counterfeited Jew; secret and sacred), as in the following mi-
mi<king passage of Cixous's 'Ce Corps etranjuif' where he becomes 
another genet of sorts: 
C'est ainsi sur /enco/ure$\m reve qu'il se marrane. Juiffeint. 
Le reve: se croire l'enfant d'un peuple nici ni^a le temps 
d'un reve. Nicatholique nijuif mijuif mimeme miindien 
vmcheva/.25 
'Mimeme': not only half-same but also perhaps the question of mimesis 
or even mimicry (Greek mimeme. something imitated), as in the 
sensitive plants (plantes mimeuses) 'mimicking' animal life, like the 
mimosa, which Derrida takes as a distant model for his miming 
of Francis Ponge's ('sponging' of his) signature (Signeponge, pp. 12, 
110; also p. 15: 'je feins de mimer' and especially pp. 6 0 - 6 1 for 
¥ta.nc\sponge). T h e question of (self-)reflexivity and mimesis, which 
has traditionally been the hunting ground of philosophy, has now 
been overturned into that of mimetic distancing, even mimicry, and 
s imulacrum, 2 6 from 'as is' to 'as if (not)'. Not unlike this animal plant 
or zoophyte, which serves as an analogy to the sign's relationship to 
the signatory's name (cf. Signeponge, p. 82: 'la structure spongieuse du 
signe epongerait le nom propre [. . . ] dont il voudrait signer'; 'Le signe 
eponge la signature'), Derrida's absorptive writing, of which Signeponge 
could be a paradigm, ex-pressly sponges (off) the signatories of texts it 
traverses, as if it were a sponge. 
Comment ing on period 23 of 'Circumfession', Cixous writes, with 
a tacit reference to 'L'Animal que done je suis', first heard as a lecture 
in July 1997, before recalling Derrida's 'autobiography of the lure' in 'A 
Silkworm of One's Own' 2 7 where 'he filmed himself as a silkworm': 
That's the key: this like or as if I am as if \ were another. 
H e is as if, like (as if he were) another. True, we are all 
substitutes, but he is a substitute truly like no-one. He writes 
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books that are like books [comme des livres\. As if delivered 
[comme delivre^. Such substitutingness haunts him, to be 
conscious of this as-if-being is to suffer, but it is also the 
condition of wisdom [ . . . ] . Whereupon the child that\ am, 
the animal that, the remains that [ . . . ] , the Jew that I am, 
enjoys the privileges of idiomatic homonymy: the child that 
1am (that Lfollou)), if I am it (if I follow it), it is that I am 
in the place from which I observe it \je suis au lieu depuis 
lequelje me lbhserve\, I can only follow it if I am not it. I 
am not the one that I am (that I follow) [je ne suis pas celui 
quejesuis[ (Portrait, p. 53; last two French insertions mine. 
Compare with the French Portrait, p. 52 for the repetitions 
o f ' . . . que je suis) 
To be a sage (wisdom') is to be conscious of the generalizable 
substitutability of 'I am (following)' (je suis) and 'I am as if I were 
another' (cf. 'Circumfession, 10: me the sole replacement') in a sort 
of chiasmic mirror-stage effect (this is me, I am this: fa-je) that alters 
not only subjects but also place 'itself (au lieu: in the place, but also 
suggestive of au lieu de. in place of) , so that God's 'I am that I am' 
(Exodus 3:14) is inverted into absolute dissimilitude and dissemblance. 
In LAnimal que done je suis, Derrida will call for a radicalization of 
Lacan's place of the Other beyond the dual, imaginary or specular 
relationship to a fellow living being that excludes the animal from 
alterity, the animal other, the other as animal (Animal, pp. 1 8 0 - 1 ) . 'As 
if I were wholly other', for example an animal, say a monkey (singe), as 
I am looking at it 'from my place', soon blurs into 'I am (following) a 
monkey (je suis un singe). Objecting to Lacan's denial of the animal's 
ability to erase its own traces (but also to the simplistic zoology of 
his conception of animal 'reflection' in what would be a rudimentary 
mirror stage; Animal, p. 87 and third section, passing*), Derrida notes 
that, in being able to erase being and going beyond the question ('what 
i s . . . ? ' ) , and therefore the response, '[c]e quasi-animal n'aurait plus a 
se rapporter a l'etre comme tel (Animal, p. 63) . Against an essential 'as 
such' (comme tel) of the traditional onto(theo)logy of an autobiography 
but also, as we shall see, (self-)portraiture, Derrida's comme si is (after) 
the trace (of the trace), takes after it, imitating its (self-)reflection in a 
parodic singeri^ or parrotry (Animal, p. 7 9 ) . 3 0 
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Replacing being and place (I am (following) in place of) , the 
substitutable subject is everyone and no one, everywhere and nowhere, 
including before and after. Zterrida d e q u e s , whose other, secret name 
was Elie (Elijah; 'Circumfession, 16, 17, quoting from the Book of 
Elijah), signi(fyi)ng election, '[c]omme si j'etais l'elu secret de ce qu'ils 
appellent les animaux [Animal, p. 91) , already (dejd) and behind 
(derriere), in the sum of his autozootoheterobiographical fictions, 
especially: 'his brother Elie, i.e. me, already ('Circumfession, 25) but 
also the rewriting of the logic of obsequence in Glas as the Augustinian 
cogito of'already 1am dead ('Circumfession, 25; cf. also n. 11 supra)', 
'reste [d'Est(h)er - one of his mother's other names] que je suis ici' 
( 'Circumfession, 10; cf. also period 3 and Cixous, Portrait, pp. 51 -54 ) ; 
'Derrittz le ridead (Glas, p. 68bi; cf. also The Post Card, p. 78) , i.e. 
always already deja derriere (Glas, passim), etc. As he wittily summarized 
in 'Limited Inc a b c', his reply to Searle's heavy-handed critique of 
'Signature Event Context' or, for short, 'Sec': 
I have, in other texts, devised countless games, playing with 
'my name', with the letters and syllables /a, Der, Da. Is my 
name still 'proper', or my signature, when, in proximity to 
'There. J . D . ' (pronounced, in French, approximately Der. 
J . D . ) , in proximity to 'Wo? Da.' in German, to 'Her. J . D . ' 
in Danish, they begin to function as integral or fragmented 
entities [corps], or as whole segments of common nouns or 
even of things? 3 1 
Jacques Derrida's signatures 3 2 disseminate themselves in simulacra of 
divine revelations of a 'first and l(e)ast' or of an 'exodic' je (ne) suis 
(pas) celui que je suis, of halves of traces occupying all the positions, 
like an animal throwing his hunters off his scent, blurring his tracks. 
3. From Saint-Je to Singe*. Mimesis head, to head with mimicry 
Holy monkey! 
Taking after the Confessions of Saint Augustine or SA - weeping the 
death of his mother, whereas Derrida's 'Circumfession' was written 
before the expected death of his own 3 3 - the fifty-nine neo-Augustine 
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periods of the then 59-year-old former resident at rue Saint-Augustin 
in Algiers had already set up the scene for exploring the convergence 
between autobiography and sacrality in the philosophical writing of a 
SA-je, beyond the theatrical use of quasi-divine formulas noted above. 
A similar saintliness of place and even first name had presided over 
the first meeting between Cixous and Derrida, '[a]t the foot of the 
Montagne Sainte-Genevieve, at the corner of the Rue St. Jacques', 
as Cixous implicitly recalls in her Portrait (p. 4) , whose French title 
also phonically suggests the singe in Saintfulfil Derrida will return 
to this association in LAnimal que done je suis, while building on his 
former reflections on sacredness and the auto-immune in 'Faith and 
Knowledge': 3 5 
L'autobiographie, l'ecriture de soi du vivant, la trace du 
vivant pour soi, l'etre pour soi, 1'auto-affection ou l'auto-
infection comme memoire ou archive du vivant serait un 
mouvement immunitaire (done un mouvement de salut, de 
sauvetage et de salvation du sauf, du saint, de l'immun, 
de l'indemne, de la nudite virginale et intacte) mais 
un mouvement immunitaire toujours menace de devenir 
auto-immunitaire, comme tout autos, toute ipseite, tout 
mouvement automatique, automobile, autonome, auto-
referentiel. Rien ne risque d'etre aussi empoisonnant qu'une 
autobiographic, empoisonnant pour soi, d'abord, auto-
infectieux pour le presume signataire ainsi auto-affecte. 
(Animal, pp. 7 2 - 7 3 ; emphases mine) 
At once poison ^empoisonnant} and cure, or the pbarmakon which 
Of Grammatology (p. 292 , just before the passage quoted supra), then 
more sustainedly 'Plato's Pharmacy', had long ago identified writing 
as, autobiography, the self-writing of the living, keeps (away from) 
itself apotropaically according to the self-deconstructing 'logic' of the 
sauf (safe and sound; except, save), which transforms the immune into 
the auto-immune, at once inscribing and effacing its own trace in a 
'sacred' or even sacrificial act of auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphy, i.e. 
both blessed and cursed (sacer).56 At the heart of this process of self-
contamination would be the animal, or, in Cixous's Portrait, itself a 
late simulation of the Joycean counterfeiting of the sacred figure of the 
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artist, the pivotal relay between a saint-je and a singe, from the self-
reflexivity of He who says 'I am that I am' into Derrida's own playful 
simuhcia?7 and what he, referring to his former self as an adolescent, 
described as a 'profil de l'artefacteur en jeune singe 
In 'White Mythology', within a discussion of mimesis as what is 
proper to man and not to the animal for Aristotle's Poetics, Derrida 
introduces a distinction between mimesis and mimicry or singerie. 
the animal, deprived of logos, o f phone semantike, of 
stoikheion, etc., also would be incapable of mimesis. Mimesis 
thus determined belongs to logos, and is not animalistic 
aping [singerie\, or gesticular mimicry [mimique]. [Margins, 
p. 237, French insertions mine; cf. also p. 249, and Animal, 
pp. 79, 99) 
Like a silent mime, the animal would be capable only of aping [singer) 
rather than signifying. A similar reversal is at work in Derrida's 'Tete-a-
tete', 3 9 musing on Camil la Adami's giant portraits of apes, on which 
Ginette Michaud focuses her critical gaze in the last section of an 
essay devoted to the Thing-in-Painting in Nancy, Cixous and Derrida, 
entitled 'Derrida devant les Primati. penser la chose au-dela de la 
mimesis simiesque'. Derrida's tete-a-tete with the primates invitingly 
calls for a parallel with Levinas's face to face with the other who can only 
be a human, and brings out the dissymetry between the animal as object 
seen by man, and not as subject endowed with a gaze (cf. also Animal, 
p. 116), and the human gaze, as well as the issue of anthropo-morphic 
or -centric concern - both being understood in the French fa me 
regarde. (In LAnimal que done je suis, Derrida had reproached Levinas 
for not granting the animal a face [visage, Animal, pp. 148 ff. Compare 
with Derrida calling the apes ' "figures" non figurales': ' T T ' , p. 7), for 
treating them as 'des figures sans visage' ( 'TT' , p. 9) , and confessed his 
embarrassment at being looked at face to face by an animal (p. 90) , 
or here, in what the French language calls an exposition, at being ex­
posed 'naked' in front of Camelia Adami's giant apes in a novel scene of 
Revelation ( 'TT' , p. 6) stripping the philosopher of the mastery of the 
gaze.) T h e scene of the philosopher looking at the primates is reversed 
into that of his seeing himself being seen, as the philosophical 'mirror 
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stage' of mimesis, reflection, and therefore signification, is broken (cf. 
T T , p. 11): 
Chaque 'singe' vous regarde, unique, tout seul, mortel, 
depuis sa place singuliere [ . . . ] , il ne singe rien, il vous 
signifie, dans son idiome absolu, il vous singifie [ . . . ] 
( 'TT' , p. 14) 
Michaud comments: 
Pas de miroir, c'est-a-dire plus de singerie mimetique, plus 
de mimetisme simiesque (laquelle reflechit l'autre, dans 
sa reflexivite vertigineuse?), plus d'imitation ou de faire 
semblant: le singe ne singe pas l'homme, il faut repenser 
toutes les limites et les consequences de la reversibilite entre 
'singes' et 'signes', entre 'signifier' et 'singifier'4 0 
If, according to Roman Jakobson's famous formula, expressed at the 
First Congress of Semiotics in Bologna (1974) , ' tout signe est un renvoi 
(i.e. aliquidpro aliquo-. one thing for another), here, in this tete-a-tete, 
le singe ne renvoie rien. Not even an identity when, towards the end of 
the essay, in a sequence of neither-nor's which brings to mind Cixous's 
animal description of Derrida quoted before, Derrida imagines him 
saying without saying (cf. 'vous apostrophant sans se taire mais sans 
rien dire'), against Heidegger's famous judgment that he is weltarm 
(cf. also Animal, especially fourth section): 
je suis, point, j'existe, avant tout et apres tout, ni libre ni 
captif, ou 1'un et l'autre [ . . . ] . Je ne suis ni une bete ni 
personne, je suis quelqu'un mais personne: ni une personne, 
ni un sujet, ni le sujet d'un portrait' ( 'TT' , pp. 1 4 - 1 5 ) 
Worse, the lack of specularity of those portraits of apes may even 
silently suggest: 'je te renvoie a toi-meme' ( 'TT' , p. 7 ) . . . as a jeune/vieux 
singe thus captured in what becomes a self-portrait and prone to 
'songerie (also singerie + songe. dream - cf. ' T T ' , pp. 5 -6 , and p. 11: 
'corps de l'artiste en vieux singe', recalling the 'profil de l'artefacteur en 
jeunesinge seen above). 
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T h e animal' is, prior to any necessity to respond in order to show 
he can answer the question what is / are you an animal?', and Derrida's 
use of 'mimetisme (simiesque)' at once exposes man's traditional 
debunking of human mimesis into animal mimicking since Aristotle 
(see above) and reinscribes the latter as the more generalizable model of 
'representation' for the living being (zoe, zoon), not unlike the primacy 
of the arche-trace against phonologocentrism. Here again the animal 
comes before and after, which can be compared with an evocation of 
the Levinasian face to face, in which man occupies both positions of 
anteriority and posteriority: 
le visage de l'homme n'est et ne dit 'je suis' [ . . . ] que 
devant l'autre et apres l'autre, mais c'est toujours l'autre 
homme et celui-ci vient avant un animal [whereas Kant's 
Anthropology had already conceded the anteriority of the 
animal; p. 134] qui ne le regarde jamais [ . . . ] (Animal, pp. 
149 -50 ; emphases mine) 
'Les animaux me regardent', also says Derrida (Animal, p. 58; cf. also 
in Signeponge, p. 25: 'Sa signature aussi me regarde'), but their gaze and 
concern, their gaze-as-concern, does not have a place in Levinas's ethics 
of the face to face, and their '9a te regarde' (which also plays on the 
felicitous initials of Camilla ^ d a m i ) , has nothing in common with the 
'9a me regarde' traditionally assigned to the inscription of eyes within 
a painting. Ultimately 'ce qui te regarde ne te [me] regarde pas' ( 'TT' , 
p. 7 [p. 8]) in the entetement o£ a work which 'a le frontde faire face 
dans le tete-ti-tete ( 'TT' , p. 12; emphases mine) and, having dispensed 
with the mirror of specularity and speculation, leaves us head to head 
with the toutautre'('TT', p. 12). 
Taking issue with Descartes' 'methods' for distinguishing between 
the authentic and the mimetic simulacrum of the automaton (the 
animal-machine), Derrida highlights an excerpt from the Discourse 
focusing on the animal seen as a theoretic spectacle, 'le spectacle 
pour un sujet speculaire qui reflechit son essence et [ . . . ] ne veut pas 
trouver a se reflechir dans une image de l'animal qu'il regarde mais qui 
ne le regarde pas' (Animal, p. 117). Interestingly, the dissociation of 
specularity mirrors in reverse the famous 'parable' of the sardine tin in 
Lacan's theory of the gaze in Seminar XL, the separation between the 
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eye and the gaze, voir (but also se voir regarder) and etre regarde, in 
connection with animal mimicry, which Derrida also quotes 
further on: 
si <ja a un sens que Petit-Jean me dise que la boite ne me voit 
pas, c'est parce que [ . . . ] elle me regarde. Elle me regarde 
au niveau du point lumineux, ou tout ce qui est me regarde 
(Animal, p. 182) 4 1 
As we glimpsed above, je suis (apres) also becomes the question of 
je suis dapres, i.e. not only being but taking after somebody, in an act 
of (self-)portraiture which would no longer wish to signify according 
to the fixed human laws of mimesis but rather would acknowledge 
the forever shifting, impregnable alterity of the animal 'subject', of 
the animal in the subject (cf. Animal, p. 112, opposing a cinematic, 
a cynegetic, the cinematography of a persecution to the immobile 
representation of a self-portrait) but also thwarting the human logic 
of filiation and obsequence ( 'TT' , p. 11). 'Singifying' mimeticism 
in order to send it back its own (self-)reflection, to send it back to 
reflection... If deconstruction reflects (on) anything, it does so by 
speculating {on) the superficial act of (self-)reflection itself, as it probes 
into the conditions for (self-)reflexivity to 'take place', like the tain of 
the mirror, enabling reflection, which Gasche had used as the title of 
his brilliant analysis. 
In the end . . . 
'La betise consiste a vouloir conclure' 
(Gustave Flaubert) 
The concept of the '(other) as such', which founds the logos, is what 
the animal would ultimately be lacking for Heidegger, Lacan and 
Levinas {Animal, p. 194) - hence Heidegger's claim that all words 
should be placed under erasure for the animal deprived of the 'as such' 
(what Derrida calls a 'Durchstreic/runggeneraliste; Animal, pp. 2 1 6 - 7 ) . 
However, if LAnimalque done je suis does not so much want to claim a 
restitution of the possibility of 'as such' the animal has been stripped of 
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but to call into question the tradition that takes it for granted as part 
of the mastery of signs by man as a zoon logon ekhon {Animal, p. 218) , 
and for a differential analysis of the animot which would complicate 
philosophy's structuring binary opposition between the as such' and 
the not as such' (p. 214) - just as the power of self-effacement of 
the trace is opposed to its illusory mastery by a subject (p. 186) - a 
certain mimicking of the as i f , Derrida's mimicked feint or feigned 
mimicking observed in Signeponge above, could be the deconstructive 
twist by way of a 'solution'. It could itself harbour a tropic turn not 
unlike the one that torments the structure of the trace and origin as 
the traumatic effacement of what never was, an as if "as i f" not so 
much perversely coming back to an 'as such' as a figure of the same 
but countersigning it away as a counterbluff. What would have taken 
place, then, in such a repositioning of the animal via a revalorization of 
mimicking over mimesis, from the comme / /which iteratively describes 
the quasi-original scene of Derrida's feeling of shame while seeing 
himself naked in front of the animal and seeing the animal seeing him 
naked (p. 18), is differance as tempor(al)ization, of which we noted 
that it shares with trauma the structure of Nachtraglichkeit. One of 
the two brief points which Heidegger raises about the animal in Sein 
und Zeit and which he develops in the 1 9 2 9 - 3 0 seminar known as 
die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik — Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit, is 'the 
question of the temporalization of the animal' as the 'transcendental 
horizon of the question of being', of the 'essence of the animality 
of the animal' {Animal, pp. 197, 2 0 5 - 6 , 210); Derrida's differential 
'who am I (following)?' (qui suis-je!) and the philosophical fiction 
of a zootobiographical response in 'as i f countersigned by a saint-
je I singe, have sketched out attempts to overcome its ontological 
a priori by reinscribing it within a more originary structure of 
traumatic displacement and self-effacement. 
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